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Abstract In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel 
Dennett's Intentional Systems Theory (1ST) has been perceived as behaviourist or 
antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of 
the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon 
called 
'empathie resonance' (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the 
mental causation debate. Thus, 1ST + ER is a much more viable option than 1ST, 
even though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role 
that is incompatible with Dennett's writings on consciousness. 
The most fundamental thesis of Daniel Dennett's intentional systems theory (1ST; 
Dennett 1978, 1987) is that the ontology of mental states cannot be considered in 
abstraction from the epistemology of mental state ascription. From this thesis, a 
number of attractive features follow. 1ST respects the distinction between the sub 
personal and the personal level of description (the distinction is Dennett's (1969) 
own). It resists the reification of beliefs and desires like no other theory that aspires 
to a form of realism about the mental. It does not imply theses about the nature of 
the brain that may or do contradict the findings of neuroscience, nor does it need to 
postulate theses about the brain that are immune to empirical investigation. 
But 1ST has never been an overly popular position. This is due mainly to its 
perceived behaviourist, instrumentalist character?its failure to secure mental 
realism, despite its aspirations. One way to understand this opposition against 1ST, 
as I shall explain in the next section, is to construe it as a worry about the inability of 
1ST to accommodate the phenomenon of mental causation. Indeed, Dennett does not 
even 
attempt to make room for mental causation within 1ST. 
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Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9103, Nijmegen 6500 HD, 
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This is unfortunate. For it appears to suggest that the attractive features of 1ST are 
only to be had when we entirely, and according to most philosophers unrealistically, 
give up on mental causation. In this paper I address the question whether it is 
possible to retain 1ST while at the same time making an emendation to it so that 
mental causation can be accommodated by the theory. I will defend a positive 
answer: if 1ST is combined with relatively recent insights into a phenomenon 
referred to as 
'empathie resonance', I argue, it can make room for a form of mental 
causation that suffices to satisfy our intuitions. 
The paper is set up as follows: In the next section, I outline 1ST and interpret the 
anti-realism charge in terms of the failure to accommodate mental causation. In 
Sect. 2, I shall introduce empathie resonance. In Sect. 3, I will combine empathie 
resonance with 1ST. This combination, I argue in Sect. 4, makes room for 
'phenomenal causation', the causal efficacy of phenomenal states. (This result is 
incompatible with Dennett's theory of consciousness. However, I will emphasize 
that 1ST itself is independent of this theory of consciousness). In Sect. 5, I shall 
argue that in the proposed theory propositional attitudes cannot be considered 
causally efficacious, though they are what Jackson and Pettit have called 'causally 
relevant'. In Sect. 6, I argue that the combination of phenomenal causation and the 
causal relevance of propositional attitudes suffice to account for the various 
exlananda that are discussed in the debate on mental causation. 
1 Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Realism and Mental Causation 
1ST takes its cues from Wittgenstein, Ryle and Quine. From Wittgenstein and Ryle 
it extracts the idea that systems really are intentional or 'minded' systems, if their 
behaviour can fruitfully be interpreted as issuing from beliefs and desires or in short: 
folk-psychological states. From Quine it takes the idea that folk-psychological 
interpretations of behaviour can be indeterminate?it is possible to have rival 
interpretations between which we cannot decide. 
1ST is a form of interpretationism; the ontology of beliefs and desires is not 
considered independent of their epistemology. As Dennett has put it (restricting 
himself to beliefs only in this quote): 
My thesis will be that while belief is a perfectly objective phenomenon (that 
apparently makes me a realist), it can be discerned only from the point of view 
of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy [the strategy of using folk 
psychology; M.S.] and its existence can be confirmed only by an assessment of 
the success of that strategy (that apparently makes me an interpretationist) 
(Dennett 1987, p. 15). 
When interpreting the behaviour of systems in terms of beliefs and desires, we are 
adopting what Dennett calls 'the intentional stance.' That is, we interpret behaviour 
in folk-psychological terms. Though we are inclined to adopt the intentional stance 
rather quickly, e.g. when interpreting fellow humans, we can always leave that 
stance and adopt a different one, such as the physical stance or the design stance. 
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It may now seem as if 1ST claims that we turn a system into an intentional one 
merely through interpretation. But that is incorrect. A system has beliefs and 
desires, according to 1ST, if these notions really help in understanding and 
predicting the behaviour of that system. 'Exhibiting behaviour that can fruitfully be 
interpreted using the intentional stance' is a property of systems that cannot be 
assigned by us at will. It is an objective (though relational) property. 
This is why Dennett considers himself a mental realist?albeit a 'mild realist' 
(Dennett 1987, pp. 69-81, 1991a). This realism-cum-interpretationism is well 
captured by his comparison of intentional states in (folk-)psychology with centres of 
gravity in Newtonian mechanics. Like intentional states, a centre of gravity is a 
notion that abstracts away from the concrete 'behaviour' of an object, but it allows 
us to describe and predict the 'behaviour' of that object with a great degree of 
accuracy. The notion of intentional states, like the notion of a centre of gravity, is an 
informative notion that discloses information about the world that cannot be 
accessed in any other way. 
But neither mental states, nor centres of gravity are real entities or objects. 
Dennett makes an effort to combine a strong resistance against the reification of 
beliefs and desires with what he considers a form of mental realism. Beliefs are real, 
he claims. But to consider them entities that exist in our heads would be to apply a 
concept at the sub-personal level of description that has its use (and hence in a 
Wittgensteinian view, it's meaning) at the personal level of description only. 
Denying that beliefs are entities in the head is not denying their reality, it is to make 
a claim about their nature: they are states of whole persons (or other systems), not 
parts of them. People really believe things. Just like people can really be fatigued. 
But 'a belief is just as much a thing as 'a fatigue'. 
To many philosophers, including myself, this strong resistance to reification of 
belief and this strict separation of the personal and sub personal level of description 
are attractive features of 1ST. But at the same time, this position is generally viewed 
as not succeeding in establishing a mental realism that is strong enough to cater for 
our commonsense needs. The perception is that 1ST is an 'as if theory of mental state 
ascription (McCulloch 1990). 
Dennett 
acknowledges this worry and has attempted to put it at ease at several 
occasions (most prominently in Dennett 1991a, but earlier in 1987, pp. 37-42 and 
pp. 69-81; part of the point of these texts gets a more elaborate treatment in Chapter 
2 of his 2003a). Folk-psychological predicates track patterns in behaviour, he argues 
(just like centres of gravity track patterns in movement of objects). And these 
patterns may require a perceiver in order to be recognized, but that doesn't mean 
they are merely 'in the eye of the beholder'. They exist 'out there'. And if, as 
Dennett argues, our folk-psychology is the only access we have to these patterns, 
then folk-psychological predicates disclose a part of objective reality for us. 
Although there is much more to say about this patterns-response, I shall set it 
aside. For although it does address some of the intuitive worries about the type of 
mental realism Dennett defends, it does not address all of them. Take Jerry Fodor's 
description of realism about propositional attitudes in general: 
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I propose to say that someone is a Realist about propositional attitudes iff (a) 
he holds that there are mental states whose occurrences and interactions cause 
behaviour and do so, moreover, in ways that respect (at least to an 
approximation) the generalizations of common-sense belief/desire psychol 
ogy; and (b) he holds that these same causally efficacious mental states are 
also semantically ?valuable (Fodor 1985, p. 78). 
From this quote, it is clear that Fodor takes causal efficacy to be a hallmark of the 
reality of intentional states. In doing so, he is in good company. Shoemaker (1980), 
for instance, argued influentially that the identity conditions of properties are to be 
spelled out in terms of their causal powers. It is impossible to discuss the connection 
between causal efficacy and reality in detail here. But I shall treat the connection as 
a very strong intuition that cannot be ignored. 
Yet Dennett does seem to ignore it. The patterns response in no way addresses 
the issue of mental causation. Part of Fodor's charge (and that of many others) is 
that 1ST leaves no room for causally efficacious mental states. According to 1ST, 
beliefs are like centres of gravity. But centres of gravity lack causal efficacy too, and 
that is why many do not consider them real, pace Dennett. The failure to 
accommodate mental realism, then, can be construed as at least partly being due to a 
failure to accommodate mental causation. 
In reply to this, the patterns response can in turn be construed as arguing that 
mental causation is not a precondition for mental realism. But that would raise the 
question why Dennett never addresses the issue of mental causation directly. And 
why he never bothered to reject Davidson's original argument for taking reasons to 
be causes (Davidson 1963). I submit that it is precisely because the patterns 
response ignores the issue of mental causation that most philosophers are not 
convinced by it. 
To this situation, 1ST can react in two ways. One?which I take to be Dennett's 
option?is to argue against the idea that mental states must be construed as causes in 
order to be considered real. Another option would be to see whether some form of 
mental causation can be made compatible with 1ST's interpretationism. It is this 
latter option that I shall pursue. 
2 Empathie Resonance 
What I should like to propose is?to put it in a slogan-like way?that 1ST may 
leave room for a form of mental causation if the behavioural patterns that are 
interpreted using the intentional stance are not conceived of as consisting of 
bodily movements, but rather of bodily gestures. To put some flesh on these bare 
bones, what is required for this is that the behaviour that is being interpreted is not 
just passively perceived via ordinary sensory perception, but rather perceived via 
what I shall label 
'empathie resonance'. In this section I shall first introduce 
empathie resonance. In the next section I shall distinguish it from and connect it 
to 1ST. In the rest of the paper I shall explain how the combined theory can deal 
with mental causation. 
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Empathie resonance is a phenomenon in the domain of social cognition that plays 
a significant role in a variety of theories of social cognition. It can be introduced as 
an 
extrapolation of the phenomenon of emotional contagion. 
Emotional contagion is a "multiply determined family of social, psychophys 
iological, and behavioural phenomena" (Hatfield et al. 1994, p. 7) in which one 
person directly 'picks up' the emotional 'drive' behind the facial expression, bodily 
posture, gesture, etc. of another person. Consider the following example by Robert 
Gordon in which he describes Hermia's attempt to understand and predict the 
behaviour of Demetrius in a scene added to Shakespeare's Midsummer Nights 
Dream: 
(...) [T]he sight of Demetrius' facial expression would probably have 
produced a similar expression on Hermia's face?even if not a visually 
detectable expression, at least the corresponding pattern of muscular 
innervation. And these copy-cat innervation patterns, at least when they 
replicate another's expression of emotion, tend to produce an emotion in us, 
typically (where there are no relevant cultural differences), an emotion similar 
to the one that caused the other's original expression. Thus, by replicating the 
facial expressions of others, we would tend to 'catch' the emotions expressed 
(Gordon 1996, p. 13). 
The example is fictional. The phenomenon described in it is very real (see e.g. 
Melzoff and Gopnik 1993) and very salient in everyday social interaction (see 
especially Hatfield et al. 1994, pp. 79-127). 
In the most elaborate study into this phenomenon published so far, Hatfield et al. 
propose a plausible and hence widely accepted analysis of this phenomenon in two 
steps: (i) the first step is the mimicry of observed behaviour, usually involuntary, 
and often below the threshold of conscious awareness. The tendency to mimic 
behaviour, especially of the mother, is present in people directly from birth onwards 
(Melzoff and Moore 1977). The discovery of mirror neurons (Pellegrino et al. 1992; 
Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Fadiga et al. 1995) is an important 
contribution (but probably not more than that) to our understanding of the 
neurological mechanisms behind such mimicry, (ii) The second step is derived from 
Darwin's (1872/1965) and James' (1890/1984) observation that emotional experi 
ence is profoundly affected by 'feedback' from facial muscles, the internal 
perception of visceral organs, the proprioception of bodily posture etc. (see also 
Damasio 1994). Emotions are enhanced by their corporeal expression to such an 
extent that the relevant muscular activity (or, as the discovery of mirror neurons 
now suggests, even the relevant premotor activity in the brain; Iacoboni 2003; Carr 
et al. 2003) when mimicked, would produce a faint echo of the emotion behind the 
behaviour that is being mimicked. 
In order to turn this phenomenon into a primitive, pre-conceptual form of 
ascription of emotions, as Gordon and many others (e.g. G?llese and Goldman 
1998) at least seem to suggest, a third step is needed. For experiencing an 'echo' of 
someone else's emotion is not yet attributing anything to anyone (see Goldman 
2006, pp. 133-134). This third step may consist of employing a version of the theory 
4y Springer 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 07:40:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
326 M.V.P. Slors 
of mindreading (see e.g. Perner 1996). I shall defer issues of ascription to the next 
section. 
Iacoboni (2003) speaks of 'empathie resonance' instead of 'emotional conta 
gion'. That seems to reflect an appropriate broadening of the phenomenon to 
situations in which the meaning of the term 'emotion' would have to be stretched 
beyond recognition. One of the best examples of the phenomenon, for instance, is 
the inclination to yawn when one sees, hears or even reads about someone else 
yawning (Provine 1986, 1989). But unlike e.g. laughter (Provine 1992) the 'feel', 
'urge', or 'drive' behind it falls outside most people's class of emotions. So, a more 
general term such as 'empathie resonance' seems appropriate. It signifies the pick 
up and often the implicit attribution of the 'feel/urge/drive' behind basic bodily 
'actions' such as facial expressions, gestures, bodily postures expressive of intended 
behaviour etc. 
In the case of yawning, the behaviour with which we tend to resonate is likely to 
be unintentional. But we also (and very often) resonate with intentional behaviour. 
And that is where empathie resonance becomes a form of social cognition. Think of 
the pick up of anger in someone's behaviour. But also of the way we directly 
'perceive' someone's intention to open a door, pick up a glass, or shake hands. What 
we pick up in the case of intentional action is an 'urge' or 'drive' behind or in a 
sense in an action as an unconceptualized basic intention (but not (yet) as beliefs 
and desires; for elaborate overviews of the kind of social cognition that empathie 
resonance allows for, see e.g. Gallagher 2004, 2005, Ch. 9; and Bloom 2004, Ch. 1). 
By replacing the term 'emotional contagion' with 'empathie resonance' and by 
recognizing that by means of such resonance we can pick-up on basic intentions of 
others, we may label the idea that basic intentions are 'visible' in gestures, bodily 
posture, and facial expressions, a 'Darwin-James-like view of intention-in-action' 
(to distinguish it from Searle (2001), whose notion of intention-in-action is about 
propositional attitudes rather than?often emotionally laden?basic intentions). 
3 Empathie Resonance and Intentional System Theory Combined 
When we adopt the intentional stance in order to interpret the behaviour of others 
and when we empathically resonate with the behaviour of someone else, 
superficially speaking we do similar things. In both cases a mental drive is 
postulated on the basis of observed behaviour. The similarity is, indeed, merely 
superficial, as I shall explain below. As a consequence, something needs to be said 
about a division of labour between the two when it comes to mental state ascription 
on the basis of observed behaviour. I will argue that the division of labour must be 
such that adopting the intentional stance in stereotypical cases involves interpreting 
information about the behaviour of others acquired via empathie resonance (ER). 
The difference between ER and 1ST can best be elaborated on by assigning them a 
location on the map of possible options in the debate over the nature of mental state 
ascription. The debate is dominated by various forms of 'theory theory' (TT) and 
various forms of 'simulation theory' (ST), though Shaun Gallagher's (2004, 2005) 
interaction theory (IT) might be regarded as a third option. ER is entirely at home in 
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the camp of ST or IT; 1ST is a form of TT. Let me briefly say something about these 
claims. 
It is certainly not the case that ER fits all forms of simulationism. In particular all 
forms of simulationism that involve a conscious effort to place oneself imagina 
tively in the shoes of the person whose behaviour is being interpreted (e.g. Harris 
1991, 1992; Heal 1986, 1996) involve much more than just ER and do not even 
mention it. Other versions, such as Gordon's (1996) radical simulationism and to a 
lesser extent Perner's (1996) TT/ST mix-theory, explicitly involve something like 
ER as part of what is involved in mental state attribution. And then there is 
Goldman and G?llese's (1998) version of simulationism as backed up by mirror 
neurons that almost describes ST as a form of ER. Finally, ER is a conditio sine qua 
non for the majority of social cognition capacities described in Gallagher's IT. 
More important than the fact that ER does appear at home in IT and many 
versions of ST is the fact that ER involves no theory use. It doesn't involve folk 
psychology. Regardless of whether or not it is part of ST or IT, it is not a version of 
TT. 1ST, by contrast, explicitly is a version of TT. Attribution of intentional states is 
a form of theorizing according to Dennett, as e.g. the comparison between 
intentional states and centres of gravity shows. Moreover, Dennett is of the opinion 
that simulation ultimately collapses into theory use (see especially Dennett 1987, 
pp. 100-101). 
So, ER and 1ST describe different 'activities', when it comes to the ascription of 
mental drives behind behaviour. And that poses the question of the division of 
labour between them. It might seem plausible to argue that ER and adopting the 
intentional stance serve related but different purposes and hence occur in different 
situations. But this would imply that we do not usually empathically resonate with 
behaviour we interpret using the intentional stance. And that seems typically wrong. 
We do often adopt the intentional stance after we empathically resonate with 
someone's behaviour. In fact, we typically start to interpret the behaviour of other 
people after we perceive intentionality in that behaviour; we do not interpret 
sneezes and hiccups using the intentional stance. The intuitive division of labour 
between ER and 1ST in stereotypical cases that I would propose is as follows: ER is 
used to determine whether the behaviour of the system warrants further intentional 
interpretation (not all behaviour we resonate with does: yawning doesn't require 
further interpretation (usually), aggressive gestures do); if so, the intentional stance 
is adopted in order to interpret the behaviour in folk-psychological terms. There is 
much to say about how this interpretation proceeds. But given that none of the 
following depends on these details I will leave it at this here. 
This proposal implies a deviation from Dennett's original 1ST. For it implies that 
we typically adopt the intentional stance towards beings with which we resonate 
empathically, whereas Dennett (being a theory theorist) used to speak freely of us 
adopting the stance towards suspension bridges and thermostats. On my proposal, 
these would be atypical as if cases of applying the intentional stance that are derived 
from real cases. 
Strikingly, Dennett makes a proposal similar to the above in his last book 
(Dennett 2006), thus indicating?but not explicitly recognizing?a change in his 
position. He does not speak of empathie resonance, but of our having and using an 
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'Agent Detection Device' (ADD) that is similar to what Simon Baron Cohen calls 
an 
'Intentionality Detector' (Baron Cohen 1995). He describes it as "a Good Trick 
of evolution to discriminate banal motions (the rustling of leaves or swaying of 
seaweed) from those that signal the presence of a predator, prey, mate or rival 
conspecific" (2006, p. 108-189). To be sure, Dennett's ADD need not involve ER. 
The similarity between Dennett's move and my proposal is not so much in a 
possible overlap between ADD and ER (though I strongly believe there is overlap at 
least in the human case), but in the fact that there appears to be agreement over the 
idea that the job of judging a system suitable for intentional interpretation is not 
(or: no longer) assigned to the intentional stance but to a capacity the employment 
of which precedes adopting the intentional stance. 
Adopting the intentional stance, according to Dennett (2006), is a capacity 
available to higher animals. These do not only detect agents, but can also 
discriminate between sorts of behaviour: will it attack or flee, will it back down 
when I threaten it, does it want to eat me or my neighbour? Dennett: "These clever 
animals have discovered the further [my emphasis] Good Trick of adopting the 
intentional stance [Dennett's emphasis]" (2006, p. 109). 
The position that emerges from a combination of 1ST and ER differs in a number 
of crucial respects from Dennett's current position. Let me fill in some details about 
the combined IST + ER position by highlighting two important differences. 
To start with, the function Dennett assigns to ADD's differs subtly from the 
function I assign to ER. ADD's serve merely to indicate whether a system is an 
intentional system. All further questions about the nature of the perceived 
intentionality of behaviour are to be answered by adopting the intentional stance. 
ER, by contrast, does not merely indicate that a system displays intentional 
behaviour, but also allows us some insight into the nature of the perceived 
intentional behaviour. Through empathie resonance we do not just perceive 'pure 
intentionality'. Rather we perceive, e.g. anger, fright, shyness, a cooperative 
attitude, an intention to shake hands or open a door, etc. This is a good reason to 
favour ER over ADD's?in Dennett's sense?as a necessary step preceding the use 
of an intentional stance: it seems highly artificial to claim that animals are capable 
of perceiving intentionality in behaviour without being aware at all of the kind of 
intentionality involved. 
The second difference is even more important from the perspective of the current 
project. Through empathie resonance, we have indirect access to the urges or drives 
behind the behaviour of others. I want to insist on the idea that the agents whose 
behaviour is observed via ER usually experience these urges or drives. There 
usually is a phenomenal aspect to anger, fright, shyness and other motivations 
accessible via ER. Often, but certainly not always, this phenomenal aspect is 
'mirrored' in the empathically resonating observer (see the quote by Gordon above). 
But here I am concerned with the phenomenal character of the motivating drive or 
urge behind the behaviour of the observed person. 
The reason that I insist on the phenomenal character of these motivations is the 
implication that the internal states of others tracked via ER are at least in some sense 
mental. This will be crucial when it comes to the question of mental causation. 
? Springer 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 07:40:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Intentional Systems Theory 329 
Before I will discuss this, let me emphasize that this particular aspect of the 
IST + ER proposal is incompatible with Dennett's oeuvre. When it comes to the 
phenomenal character of mental states, Dennett basically is an eliminativist 
(Dennett 1988, 1991b; Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992). This, however, does not 
make my proposal incoherent: although Dennett's position on phenomenal 
consciousness does presuppose 1ST, the reverse is not true. 1ST is completely 
independent of Dennett's views on consciousness. 
4 Phenomenal Causation 
The claim I wish to make in this brief section is that the position described above 
allows at least for the possibility of a form of mental causation, sometimes called 
phenomenal causation (Tye 1995). The main observation that is required to make 
this claim is that the ontological status of the 'urges' and 'drives' behind behaviour 
to which we have indirect access through ER?the motivations that are discerned 
before adopting the intentional stance in stereotypical situations?is fundamentally 
different from the ontological status of the full-blown propositional attitudes we 
attribute using the intentional stance. While propositional attitudes are, according to 
1ST, useful interpretations of behaviour, a heuristic overlay, these subjectively felt 
urges and drives are real internal states of the agent. Interpretations and heuristic 
overlays cannot cause anything, but real internal states can. 
Let me be clear about what the proposal is here. The claim is not that ER is 
involved in mental causation. Rather, the claim is that by making ER compatible 
with and required by 1ST?as I have tried to do above?the combined 1ST + ER 
theory implies the reality of phenomenal motivations behind intentional action in a 
way that suggests phenomenal causation. It is quite possible that the subjective 
'feels' behind intentional actions are actually causally involved in the production of 
those actions. It certainly is possible that the anger I feel is causally responsible for 
my shouting, that the positive feeling I have when recognizing my children at the 
schoolyard causes me to smile, etc. These would be instances of phenomenal 
causation. 
The type of mental causation that I am suggesting might be involved here does 
not 
exactly match the Darwin-James-like view of intention-in-action. For in that 
view the basic intention more or less coincides with the action. Intuitively at least, a 
time lag between intention and action is required for causation. But of course, 
perceiving temporally separate occasions of basic intentions-in-action does allow 
for the required time lag and hence may justify using the Darwin-James-like view in 
connection with phenomenal causation. For instance, I may perceive anger in 
someone's facial expression and shouting by that person a few seconds later, in 
which case I may infer that the shouting may have been caused by the anger. 
Of course the actual causal efficacy of phenomenal urges and drives is not 
something that I can argue for here. It is certainly possible that such a phenomenal 
feel is itself the effect of the actual brain state that is causally efficacious in 
producing the action associated with the feel (see, e.g., Kim 1998, pp. 70-72). 
Psychologists such as Daniel Wegner claim that such epiphenomenalism is the 
normal situation (Wegner 2002; NB: Dennett appears to be largely in agreement, 
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2003b), but this is controversial (see e.g. Nahmias 2002; Bayne 2006). This is not 
the place to try and settle that controversy, however. My claim in this section is that 
the possibility that these urges and drives cause behaviour is in no way contradicted 
by 1ST + ER. Therefore, an IST-like position that includes a form of mental 
causation is an option. 
5 The Causal Relevance of Propositional Attitudes 
Phenomenal causation is a form of mental causation. But it is not the kind that is the 
prime concern of the majority of philosophers active in the debate on mental 
causation. The kind of causation that occupies centre stage in that debate is 
causation of actions by propositional attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires. 
Admittedly, according to the theory of the mental that results from combining 
1ST with ER, propositional attitudes have no causal efficacy. Attributions of beliefs 
and desires, according to that theory, are interpretations?interpretations of 
unconceptualized internal motivational states accessed via ER. And even though 
they are interpretations of internal states that may themselves be causally efficacious 
in producing actions, interpretations are as such not directly causally efficacious. 
The purpose of this section, however, is to claim that though propositional attitudes 
are not efficacious in the proposal under discussion, they are what Jackson and Pettit 
would call causally relevant. Whether that is sufficient to satisfy our intuitions about 
mental causation will be discussed in the next section. 
The notion of causal relevance was introduced in the context of Jackson and Pettit's 
'program model' (Jackson and Pettit 1988, 1990; Pettit 1993), an attempt to grant 
multiply realisable higher order properties such as states defined in terms of their 
causal roles (e.g., according to functionalism, mental states) a job in causal 
explanations, while acknowledging that the real causal work in this world is being done 
in the micro-physical realm. For instance: even though all causal efficacy is in that 
realm, the elasticity of an eraser is causally relevant to it's bending (Pettit 1993, p. 33). 
The basic idea is the following: correctly attributing to an entity or system a state 
defined in terms of a causal role (e.g. attributing elasticity to an eraser, or, assuming 
functionalism, attributing a belief to a person) secures the presence of some realizer 
that plays the causal role in terms of which the attributed state is defined. Elasticity, 
being a supervenient property, may not be a causally efficacious property, but 
attributing it to an eraser means attributing a micro-physical structure that plays the 
causal role of being elastic. In Jackson and Pettit's terms: elasticity programs for 
certain 'behaviour' under certain circumstances. Which is why it can function in 
causal explanations without itself being causally efficacious. 
The notion of causal relevance was advanced in the context of supervenience 
relations allowing higher order properties to be multiplying realisable by various 
types of configuration of micro-physical particles. In view of Kim's attack on 
multiple realisation (1992) and his introduction of the orders/levels distinction 
(1998), it might seem problematic nowadays. The use I will make of it here is not 
based on multiply realisable supervenience relations, but on relations of interpre 
tation. 
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I believe that the notion of causal relevance also applies to propositional attitudes 
in the theory that combines 1ST with ER. The idea here is that the appropriateness or 
the fruitfulness of an interpretation of an internal motivational state in terms of, say, 
a desire D and belief B, signals the presence of an internal state with a specific 
causal profile approximated by D and B. Of course the term 'approximation' makes 
for a significant difference with the program model in which D and B would be 
completely captured by their supervenience base, thus securing a nomological 
connection between D and B and the causally efficacious base. Such a nomological 
connection is not to be had in the case of mere approximation. Nevertheless, I 
believe the connection between D and B on the one hand and the phenomenal 
motivations they signal on the other, to be reliable enough to warrant the term 
'causal relevance'. Folk-psychology is immensely successful in capturing the causal 
profiles of our motivations. The fact that it is not infallible only underlines, in my 
opinion, that IST + ER yields a more realistic view of it than does the program 
model. 
Thus, like with the program model, when the state a person is in is best described 
in terms of a (set of) propositional attitude(s), that reliably indicates the presence of 
some internal state that will cause the actions that D and B help to predict. In the 
combined IST + ER theory, propositional attitudes are causally relevant despite 
being causally inefficacious. 
6 Is this Sufficient to Satisfy our Intuitions about Mental Causation? 
A program model-like view on the mental causation issue would be compatible with 
Dennett's 1ST too, to be sure. The difference between 1ST and IST + ER in this 
respect, is 'merely' the fact that on the latter theory the internal, causally efficacious 
states are considered unconceptualized motivational (i.e. mental) states, due to their 
specific phenomenal character. On 1ST, by contrast, they are mere brain states. 
This difference is crucial, I will argue in this last section. Even if Dennett would 
embrace the idea of causal relevance, when it comes to accounting for intuitions 
about mental causation that would be his only resource. He would have to claim that 
causal relevance explains all our intuitions about mental causation. I will argue that 
this is unrealistic by showing how IST + ER can account for these intuitions only 
by assigning important work to the phenomenal character of the internal 
motivational states that are being interpreted using folk-psychology. Thus, the 
explanatory burden on the shoulders of 'merely' causally relevant beliefs and 
desires becomes more limited and realistic. 
I take an adequate account of what is at stake in the debate on mental causation to 
explain at least three things: (1) Most of our actions can be rationalized using 
various reasons. Usually, though, there is only one reason for which we did an 
action. According to Davidson (1963) and a majority of analytical philosophers, the 
way to single out the reason for which we did an action is to claim that this reason 
was the one that caused our action. (2) Practical reasoning, the outcome of which is 
the formation of intentions, matters to the way we act. According to most, this is 
because intentions, e.g. belief-desire pairs, cause actions. (3) There is a phenom 
enology of doing. This occupies centre-stage in Daniel Wegner's (2002) book 
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against the reality of what he calls 'conscious will' (a notion that overlaps with 
mental causation rather than with free will). The intuition here is that while acting 
intentionally and consciously, there is an experience (rather than belief) of 'doing', 
an 
experience of the actions done as mine. Wegner: "Consciously willing an action 
requires a feeling of doing (...), a kind of internal "oomph" that somehow certifies 
authentically that one has done the action" (Wegner 2002, p. 4).1 
The first two explananda are about reasons for action, i.e. about propositional 
attitudes explaining actions and not so much about the phenomenology of agency. 
The third explanandum, by contrast, is not about reasons or propositional attitudes, 
but about an 
'oomph', an experience of being an agent, the 'author' of one's actions. 
Starting with the third explanandum, I believe there is good reason to relieve 
propositional attitudes of a potential explanatory task here. Recent research into the 
phenomenology of intentional agency highlights the point that first experiencing 
oneself to form an intention at the level of propositional attitudes (say, on the basis 
of a belief and a desire) and consequently experiencing oneself to act as intended is 
actually very rare. Moreover it is not an experience of doing (Horgan et al. 2003; 
Horgan and Tienson 2002, 2003; Bayne 2006; Bayne and Levy 2006). What we 
experience is the conjunction?in Humean terms?of an intention and an action. 
Perhaps, if we experience the conjunction as causation, it would be an experience of 
doing.2 But even on a Humean theory of causation in terms of constant conjunction, 
experiencing conjunctions of intentions and actions is merely enough to inductively 
infer mental causation, given that constant conjunction cannot be experienced. 
Explaining the experience of doing cannot be done in terms of actions matching 
prior intentions. Hence, whether intentions, or beliefs and desires, that precede 
actions are causally efficacious or causally relevant, is irrelevant in this specific 
context. 
Can the third explanandum, Wegner's 'oomph', be explained in terms of the 
Darwin-James-like view of intention-in-action? I believe it can in a straightforward 
fashion: It is very intuitive to hold that Wegner's 'oomph' and the unconceptualized 
phenomenal motivational states we are able to 'pick up' via ER?the urges and 
drives?are different ways of referring to the same kind of experience. What we 
pick up on when we empathically resonate with other people, I submit, are precisely 
their Wegnerian 'oomphs'. 
I now turn to the first two explananda. Given that these are about propositional 
attitudes there is no point trying to explain them in terms of the phenomenal 
causation of Sect. 4. But they can be explained in terms of the causal relevance of 
propositional attitudes. 
1 As mentioned in Sect. 4, Wegner thinks it is an illusion that this 'oomph' indicates real causal efficacy. 
Others (e.g. Bayne 2006) think it is at least possible that there is no illusion involved here. It is the 
compatibility of that last option with 1ST (by adding ER) that I am arguing for here. 
2 
In arguing against a Humean conception of causation, Thomas Reid exploited this observation. 
Causation, he insisted, must not just be conceived of in terms of a conjunction of separated events; there 
must be some inner connection too. Reid noted that possibly the only instance in which such a connection 
can be experienced, is in the experience of doing. Thus, insofar as the concept derives from experience, 
"the conception of an efficient cause may very probably be derived from the experience we had (...) of 
our own power to produce certain effects (...)" (Reid 1785, quoted by Chisholm 1982, p. 31). 
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Causal relevance of propositional attitudes can deal with the first explanandum in 
the following way: There are good and bad folk-psychological interpretations of 
unconceptualized internal motivational states. The best interpretation is the one that 
predicts a range of actions that is closest to the factual range of actions the internal 
states causally allows for. The idea here simply is that the best interpretation picks 
out the reason for which a person did an action from the range of possible reasons. 
This does not require any causal efficacy on the part of the attributed beliefs and 
desires. But obviously, there should be causal relevance to the attributed beliefs and 
desires. 
Indeterminacy of reason attribution can be considered a problem here. 1ST allows 
for the possibility of rivalling reason attributions that are equally adequate when it 
comes to action prediction. In cases of indeterminacy, on 1ST, there is not one 
reason for which a person did something. The problem is not serious: It must be 
emphasized that even Dennett thinks such cases are extremely rare or even just 
theoretical. 
In order to see that causal relevance of propositional attitudes can deal with the 
second explanandum, we must be aware of the nature of practical reasoning according 
to IST + ER. Practical reasoning is making inferences involving propositional 
attitudes. On IST + ER, entertaining propositional attitudes is in fact interpreting ones 
own urges and drives. We can think of a process of practical reasoning in terms of 
beliefs and desires interacting. But the view of the interpretationist position implied 
here, is that practical reasoning involves focussing on some urges, disregarding others, 
even letting new kinds of urges emerge and finding a strategy of action that does justice 
to most or the most urgent (literally) ones (we need not think of this in terms of a 
homunculus who is busy selecting some urges and blocking others, of course). This 
process can be described as beliefs and desires interacting, but also as a form of self 
interpretation. The outcome of such a process can be portrayed as the formation of an 
intention to act or as the desire for x and the belief that y-ing will achieve x. 
The point is that considering this intention or belief/desire pair or preceding 
beliefs and desires to be merely causally relevant in no way implies the rejection of 
the fact that some urges are focus sed on and others ignored; practical reasoning does 
matter to how we act. But once again, causal relevance is required for us to be able 
to conceive of practical reasoning in folk-psychological terms: e.g. for the outcome 
of a process of practical reasoning to be describable as an intention, the causal role 
definition of the intention must actually match the causal profile of the relevant 
internal state. 
The one question that remains is whether there is something missing from the 
above account of the explananda involved in the debate over mental causation, due 
to the fact that propositional attitudes are merely causally relevant. My answer is 
negative. 
The intuition that something is missing might be phrased as follows. Most of us 
identify with our minds rather than with our bodies (Bloom 2004; people usually say 
they are their minds and have their bodies). And when thinking about minds we 
usually think about our thoughts; the intuition is "I am my thoughts". Hence there is 
a tendency to conclude that "when / do something, my thoughts must be causally 
efficacious in producing an action." Now of course the concept 'thoughts' is vague 
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here. A natural interpretation of it is in terms of beliefs, desires and other 
propositional attitudes. Under that interpretation, what happens is that the third 
explanandum needs to be being taken care of at the level of full blown propositional 
attitudes. As we have seen, that is not possible. 
The real intuitive problem here is not that causally relevant propositional 
attitudes are insufficient for explananda 1 and 2, it is that they are insufficient for 
explanandum 3. This may be a problem for 1ST, but not for 1ST + ER. For on that 
proposal, explanandum 3 is being explained in terms of the Darwin-James-like view 
on intention-in-action. So, it is because explanandum 3 is taken care of in a 
phenomenologically adequate fashion by the ER-component of the theory under 
discussion that the explanation of explananda 1 and 2 in terms of causal relevance 
by the IST-component suffices. 
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